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Director of Central Intelligence

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National Intelligence Estimate

Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

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Volume I—The Estimate

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Volume I—The Estimate

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June 1993

Figure 1
Ethnic Composition in the Former Yugoslavia


The conflict in the former Yugoslavia transcends political boundaries. Substantial minorities of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, especially in the Krajina, Herzegovina, and Slavonia, found themselves under the political authority of rival ethnic groups when Yugoslavia broke up in 1991. Ethnic animosities and the rise of nationalist political leaders seeking to exploit them for their own advantage virtually guaranteed the outbreak of civil war. The combatants have been seeking to solidify their control over areas they regard as historically theirs; together with "ethnic cleansing" and voluntary migrations this process has led to major changes in regional ethnic composition.
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles
Austria
Slovenia
LJUBLJANA
ZAGREB
Hungary
Croatia
Slavonia
Krajina
Vojvodina (autonomous province)
Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a joint independent state, but this entity has not been formally recognized as a state by the United States.
Macedonia has proclaimed independent statehood but has not been formally recognized as a state by the United States.
Romania
BELGRADE
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
SARAJEVO
Dalmatia
Herzegovina
Montenegro
Kosovo (autonomous province)
Bulgaria
PODGORICA
Adriatic Sea
Italy
SKOPJE
Macedonia
Albania
Greece
Albanians
Bulgarians
Croats
Hungarians
Macedonians
Montenegrins
Muslims
Serbs
Slovaks
Slovenes
No majority present
Based on opstina data from 1991 census.

Unclassified

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Combatant forces in the states of the former Yugoslavia

Croatia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbia and Montenegro
Croatian Armed Forces	Bosnian Serb Army (BSA)	Yugoslav Armed Forces
Krajina Serb Army	Bosnian Army (Muslim)	
	Croatian Defense Forces (HVO)	

In addition, some 100,000 indigenous Serb, Croat, and Muslim irregulars are active in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Key Judgments

Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goals and ethnic rivalries, the belligerents in the former Yugoslavia are capable of continuing the fighting for at least another year.

The offensive capabilities of the ***Yugoslav*** [1] ***Armed Forces*** are superior to those of its neighbors:

- The capabilities of Yugoslav armored and mechanized forces surpass those of neighboring republics; Belgrade would enjoy air supremacy in renewed fighting.

- Except against Macedonia, limited logistic capabilities would constrain Yugoslav ground force operations beyond border areas.

Despite substantial improvements, Croatian Ground Forces lack heavy weapons and suffer from training and leadership weaknesses; Croatia has virtually no air force:

- The ***Croatian Armed Forces*** can retake portions of Serb-held territory but cannot completely defeat Serb forces.

- Croatian forces would have difficulty resisting Yugoslav airstrikes or federal attempts to seize additional territory.

The ***Bosnian Serb Army (BSA)*** can hold virtually all its gains in Bosnia against local forces. It can take all remaining Muslim-held areas, but only at significant military and political costs it prefers not to incur.

Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) can, with the help of the Croatian army, hold current gains and take additional territory from the Bosnian Government.

The ***Bosnian Army*** can neither hold its territory against determined offensives nor retake lost ground; without substantial external support, it will slowly deteriorate.

[1] "Yugoslavia" and "Yugoslav" refer to the rump federal state comprising Serbia and Montenegro.

Western Intervention

Western intervention to enforce an agreed peace plan, to create and protect safehavens, or to enforce a partition of Bosnia could require military action to roll back territorial gains and/or disarm combatant forces. These roles would require a large-scale deployment of ground forces.

The BSA would resist a Western intervention to roll back Serb territorial gains or disarm the BSA but would quickly disintegrate; some of its forces would begin sustained guerrilla action against Western forces:

- The BSA would harass but tolerate an intervention that left its forces in place.

The Bosnian Army views Western intervention as its best hope for survival; under some circumstances local Bosnian forces could clash with Western forces, but they would be quickly overwhelmed.

Croatian and HVO forces would avoid confronting Western forces, but local clashes could occur as they exploited outside intervention for local advantage.

In the event of Western military intervention in Bosnia, Belgrade would engage Western forces directly only if they attacked Yugoslav territory or forces.

Scope Note

In May, 1993,[2] the Intelligence Community judged that implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan would require a large, open-ended commitment of ground forces rivaling in scale and duration the post armistice effort in Korea by the United Nations and that:

> None of the parties can match a NATO-led force operating under rules of engagement that allow all necessary means to enforce the Plan. Under such circumstances, assuming early challenges were met with force, fighting would be reduced and humanitarian problems mitigated. But terrorist campaigns are possible within and outside the former Yugoslavia. Even a single attack could cause a large number of casualties.
>
> International military operations in Bosnia under any plan will be difficult to organize and deploy:
>
> - Issues of command and control, rules of engagement, levels of troop contributions, and cost sharing remain unresolved.
> - While capable of making modest additional contributions, NATO allies would expect the United States to commit a major share of troops to an international force, as well as logistic, strategic lift, and intelligence support.
> - UN forces will have to supervise and enforce demilitarization and troop withdrawals and monitor heavy weaponry, internal routes, and external frontiers.
> - UN forces also will have to assume major responsibilities for refugees and displaced persons, civil administration, and rebuilding efforts in the areas they occupy.

This National Intelligence Estimate does not assess specific scenarios in comparable detail but rather examines the armed forces of the combatants in the Yugoslav conflict and presents summary assessments of their current military capabilities against one another, against neighboring states, and against a large-scale Western intervention. Additional details concerning the capabilities of the combatant forces will be presented in Volume II, Supporting Analysis, to be published.

[2] See NIE 93-22 (~~Secret~~ May 1993, *Prospects for Bosnia*.

Sources for the Estimate

Our ability to assess the status and capabilities of the armed forces in Yugoslavia has improved substantially since early 1992. In the cases of the Croatian Armed Forces, Bosnian Serb Army, Bosnian Army, Croatian Defense Forces, and the Krajina Serb Army, observation of over a year of combat has increased our understanding of how each force is organized and its strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, the Yugoslav army's intervention in eastern Bosnia and support for the Bosnian Serbs afforded additional insights into its operational capabilities.

Discussion

Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goals and ethnic rivalries, the belligerents in the former Yugoslavia can continue fighting for at least a year. The capabilities of their forces, however, vary greatly. Even within individual armies some units may consist of well-trained, professional soldiers, while others are poorly trained militias that depend on reservists and irregulars. Moreover, neither the warring republics nor factional leaders within Bosnia have firm political or operational control over these armed groups.

Capabilities Against One Another

The Yugoslav Military

The Yugoslav military's offensive capabilities are superior to those of the armed forces of any other former Yugoslav republic in large part because the federal military has more men and equipment and the only effective air force. The federal government has overhauled the armed forces after their inept performance in 1991-92 to introduce a combined arms structure, replace aging equipment, and improve training. Belgrade has also created an ethnically cohesive force by purging non-Serbs from military ranks. The military logistics system, however, remains capable of providing only limited support to mobile or extended operations.

The Yugoslav military doctrine no longer depends on a partisan war by the civilian population. Against an invading force, the military intends to employ the army's increasingly professional light infantry and motorized brigades in protracted infantry operations. In combat against Croatia, Yugoslav ground forces would be most effective in Slavonia, where they could take advantage of good roads, flat terrain, and easy access to supplies and reinforcements in northern Serbia. Although small federal units have intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Krajina, larger federal formations would have difficulty fighting in the Krajina or invading Albania and other neighboring states because of distance, terrain, and poor lines of communication. Future ground force operations would be more effective than in 1991-92.

The Yugoslav Navy was most affected by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. With the loss of more than 90 percent of its coastline, Yugoslavia was forced to relocate virtually the entire fleet to two bases in the Kotor Bay. Personnel losses resulting from the breakup affected all ranks—from specialists to the senior leadership. The Navy was inactive for most of 1992, but has in recent exercises been able to sortie most of its ships simultaneously, suggesting that it has overcome many of its logistic and personnel problems

The Yugoslav Air Force controls almost all of the former federal aircraft. Its leaders claim to have two pilots for each aircraft, and reports indicate an adequate pool of trained support personnel. Most pilots are

unfamiliar with advanced air combat, but training sorties have increased in recent months, suggesting an amelioration of logistics and aircraft readiness problems. The Air Force also has sought to improve aircraft survivability through dispersal and has increased training for night operations.

The Bosnian Serb Army

With its superior firepower and organization, the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) controls the direction and scope of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The BSA took over most of the arms and munitions of the former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) stored in Bosnia, and these stockpiles are sufficient for months of combat at current levels. The BSA is largely self-sufficient in most other military consumables, but it has relied on Belgrade—mostly for deliveries of fuel and transportation assistance. If Belgrade follows through with its recent promise to cut off aid to the Bosnian Serbs, the BSA's mobility would gradually decline.

BSA military capabilities and morale have not yet been tested by a capable enemy. Most BSA fighters are not military professionals; rather, they are locally recruited troops whose morale is only fair, particularly when they are deployed away from their homes. Morale in engaged BSA units fell sharply in the face of unexpectedly strong Muslim attacks in eastern Bosnia earlier this year. The BSA suffers from a shortage of infantry, which is spread thin across Bosnia and Herzegovina, conducting a series of sieges characterized by thin siege lines supported by overwhelming artillery superiority. Consequently, BSA leaders follow a cautious strategy, avoiding direct attacks in favor of less costly or tactically complicated sieges.

Sanctions and the Yugoslav Armed Forces

International sanctions on Yugoslavia are having little effect on the federal army. Belgrade apparently has sufficient fuel for its forces and has large stocks of weapons and munitions. Moreover, the reduction of the army and creation of a large surplus of equipment provided Belgrade with a substantial stock of replacement systems and parts. Belgrade can call on civilian assets, especially trucks and vehicles, to keep its forces going. Sanctions, even if rigidly enforced, will not begin to bite unless the army operates a large proportion of its forces in combat for an extended period, depleting military spares.

A Yugoslav military response to Western naval sanctions and embargo operations in the Adriatic would be constrained by Yugoslav naval inferiority and would focus on operations that penetrate their territorial waters. They might attempt to confront Western naval forces by escorting sanctions violators, mining their territorial waters, or using coastal cruise missile batteries to threaten Western naval units. On the Danube, surrounding states are vulnerable to Yugoslav political and economic counterpressures; they also have been implicitly threatened with Yugoslav military retaliation—a threat they find credible.

The Yugoslav Military, the State, and the People

Although the Yugoslav federal constitution asserts civilian control of the military, the armed forces remain an independent center of power. The federal president is nominally commander in chief, exercising power through a Supreme Defense Council consisting of himself and the republic presidents. In fact, he has little control over the armed forces. Consequently, the military has wide latitude to pursue its own concepts of Yugoslav national interests.

Conditioned to centralization and authoritarianism, the officer corps is sympathetic to nationalist hardliners, who are competing for their support. The Air Force is the most stridently nationalist and aggressive of Belgrade's armed forces, and has taken an increasingly independent stance. Preservation of the military's privileged status is, however, also a principal concern, and the officer corps probably believes Milosevic will guard the military's interests. The military leadership has avoided becoming the arbiter of domestic political disputes.

Commanders are taking steps to enhance public support for the armed forces. The military leadership believes popular will to resist aggression is the bedrock of Yugoslav defenses. Early in 1992, polling data suggested substantial popular support for the armed forces—over 50 percent of the Serb population were very satisfied with the army's operations; more than 55 percent voiced confidence in the army in December 1992, a higher approval rating than that of any political party. Support is strongest, however, for the defense of territory, which the Serbs view as clearly theirs, and would almost certainly increase, should the West attack Serbia proper. As in 1991, however, public support would undoubtedly fall, should the military become mired in a conflict over regions in which Serbs are in the minority.

Nevertheless, the BSA can hold virtually all of the territory it currently controls in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also capable of conquering remaining Muslim-held areas, although only at a substantial military and political cost. Because the Serbs control much of the flow of civilian supplies into Muslim areas, they can starve both residents and defenders. The Serbs can concentrate their forces and firepower and reduce Muslim pockets one at a time, as they have been doing in eastern Bosnia since early February 1993. They can follow this strategy until only Tuzla, Bihac, and Sarajevo are left and then take these towns one at a time after a prolonged siege. This approach would take many months, involve a level of casualties greater than the BSA has so far been willing to accept, and risk Western intervention. Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs will not attempt to conquer all of the remaining

Figure 2
Controlled Areas in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina



Muslim-held territories but will maintain pressure on them. At the same time, they will continue operations to seize militarily critical objectives, such as the Posavina Corridor near Brcko.

The Bosnian Serbs have the only fixed-wing combat capability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before the implementation of the "no-fly zone," the Bosnian Serbs used their air force primarily in support of their siege activities. They would be easily overwhelmed by Western air power.

The Bosnian Army

Consisting mostly of Muslims from local militia, reserve, and paramilitary units, Bosnian Army units vary widely in manpower, organization, and military capability. Command and control is loose. Because fighting takes place in isolated pockets, local commanders are virtually autonomous. Brigades—which vary greatly in size and composition—are incapable of shifting areas of operation or undertaking coordinated tactical maneuvers. The army is further crippled by desperate shortages of all types of weapons, munitions, transport, and military supplies. For example, up to one-third of the troops in some units reportedly lack personal weapons. Nevertheless, morale is high, and capable local commanders have emerged during combat.

Without outside help, the Bosnian Army will steadily deteriorate. Underequipped and poorly trained, the Bosnian Army cannot hold territory against determined Serb or Croat offensives. Because they lack mobility, heavy weapons, and ammunition, the Bosnians can rarely reply to enemy artillery, counter armor, or use massed firepower to stop infantry attacks. Local Bosnian units have frequently attacked Serb-held areas near Sarajevo and in eastern Bosnia, for example, taking and holding ground for short periods. Invariably, however, the Serbs regroup, counterattack, and eject the Bosnians.

The Croatian Defense Forces

The Croatian Defense Forces (HVO)—the indigenous Croatian force in Bosnia—is a light infantry force lacking striking power and mobility:

- Equipment and training are inadequate for unassisted offensive operations.
- The HVO's transport, communications, and command structures do not permit mobile operations.

With the help of the Croatian army, however, the HVO can hold the regions it now occupies indefinitely against the Bosnian Serb Army or Bosnian forces. In joint action, the two forces could also take additional territory from the Bosnian Government.

The Croatian Armed Forces

Croatian Ground Forces are likely to improve slowly, but currently they are unable to completely defeat Croatian Serb forces. Zagreb has streamlined its command structure and bolstered its offensive capabilities by organizing a small number of Guards mobile brigades as attack forces. Overall, however, the Croatian Armed Forces lack striking power and suffers from training and leadership weaknesses:

- The army lacks sufficient heavy weapons—tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery—to conduct or defend against a large armored attack.

Estimated Manpower and Equipment Inventories

	Yugoslav Armed Forces	Croatian Armed Forces	Bosnian Army	Bosnian Serb Army	Croatian Defense Forces	Krajina Serb Army
Personnel (*thousands*)	100	60-80	60-80	50-75	40-50	Up to 40
Tanks	1,300-1,800	250	<50	400-750	<25	300
Artillery (≥*100 mm*)	1,200-2,000	200-300	<100	700-800	<50	430 [a]
Combat aircraft (fixed wing)	240-250 [b]	2	0	21	0	0
Helicopters	111-117	13	1-2	30	0	8
Surface-to-air missile launchers [c]	306	15-21	0	38-40	0	0
Ships [d]	29-30	4-6	0	0	0	0
Submarines	5 [e]	0	0	0	0	0

[a] Includes artillery with a caliber equal to or greater than 76 mm.
[b] Some 100 additional older aircraft are in operational storage.
[c] Includes SA-2, -3, -6, -9, and -13 launchers; in addition, all forces have some shoulder-fired SAMs.
[d] Includes frigates, missile boats, and torpedo boats.
[e] Excludes five Una M 100-D minisubs.

This table is ~~Secret~~

- Air and naval capabilities are minimal.
- Enlisted training is inadequate, and few officers have commanded complex or large-scale operations.

Zagreb's military can retake portions of Serb-held territory in Croatia. In limited military operations, the Croatian forces would have their best opportunity to retake lands along the borders of the Krajina. Zagreb cannot defend against federal air attacks and would have difficulty coping with a Yugoslav armored assault in eastern Slavonia. The Croatian military position in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains strong, however, and only the direct intervention of federal ground forces can threaten Croatian-occupied areas there.

The Krajina Serb Army

Heavy weapons provide the Krajina Serb Army an advantage over Croatian Ground Forces, but command, discipline, and organizational problems constrain its effectiveness. Most of their equipment—which includes tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery—currently is operational but the Krajina Serbs probably cannot maintain it over the long term without external assistance. Moreover, political turmoil within the Serb community reportedly has prompted dissent within the officer corps and disorganization at the tactical level.

The Krajina Serbs have little ability to shift forces between widely separated areas. Serb troops, largely mobilized reservists, are ill disciplined and fight poorly. Krajina Serb

authorities will continue to look to the Bosnian Serb Army for the supplies and reinforcements with which to repulse Croatian attacks. Acting in concert, the Krajina Serb forces and Bosnian Serb or Yugoslav army would pose a significant threat to the Croatian army.

Potential Threats to Western Forces

The reactions of the combatants to a large-scale Western intervention would vary. The Serbs would pose the most direct threat to Western forces in Bosnia, but any of the combatants could threaten outside forces. Violence almost certainly would continue as each side attempted to use the Western presence for its own ends. In such circumstances, attacks on Western forces would occur. Western intervention also would affect the dynamics of current conflicts and could spark new ones.

All parties to the conflict believe that Western nations will not endure the casualties and political costs of a prolonged guerrilla war. Consequently, armed opposition to Western forces would likely take the form of sniper fire, hit-and-run attacks on bases and convoys, and mining of roads. Local reactions to Western forces would reflect the conditions under which these forces were introduced, including:

- The announced purpose of intervention and the rules of engagement.
- The rapidity, manner, and location of initial deployment.
- The size and weapons of Western forces.
- The announced duration of the Western presence.

The Context of Western Military Intervention

In assessing reactions of the combatant forces to Western military intervention, the Intelligence Community considered intervention of Western forces on a large scale—either:

- *To enforce an agreed peace accord—the Vance-Owen Plan or a variant thereof.*
- *To create and protect safehavens on a large scale or to enforce a partition of Bosnia.*

Such roles could require military action to roll back territorial gains and/or disarm combatant forces and would, in our judgment, require deploying throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina 70,000 to 80,000 troops with the heavy weapons and mobility needed to deal with outbreaks of fighting, including attacks on Western forces, which almost certainly would occur. A cease-fire that was achieved with the concurrence of—and was observed by—all parties could require a much smaller force.

The Bosnian Serb Army

The aggressiveness of the Bosnian Serb reaction to a Western intervention would depend on the extent to which they saw that intervention as threatening their territorial gains

or the integrity of the BSA. If an intervention force were charged with implementing a cease-fire that left BSA forces in place, the BSA would harass it but tolerate its presence. The BSA also probably would attempt to consolidate territorial gains in areas where Western forces were not present. Violence still would be endemic in the countryside as scores were settled, and each side maneuvered for local advantage.

The BSA would oppose a Western intervention charged with rolling back Serb territorial gains or disarming the BSA but would quickly disintegrate in the face of a determined Western operation. Limited mobility and communications would make it difficult for BSA units to coordinate their operations or to avoid air and ground attacks by Western forces, and those units that attempted to resist would be overwhelmed quickly. Most BSA soldiers would surrender, desert, or flee to Yugoslavia. Thousands of other Bosnian Serbs would, however, conduct guerrilla warfare against Western occupation forces, probably with support from Belgrade. Where they could, the guerrillas would use Bosnia and Herzegovina's rugged terrain and the sympathetic Serb population to conceal their activities, avoid Western pursuit, and obtain intelligence.

The Yugoslav Ground-Based Air Defense Network

A coordinated heavy Western air attack would overwhelm Yugoslavia's ground-based air defense network. Federal forces seized most of the nation's radars, surface-to-air missiles, and control equipment when Yugoslavia broke up. The Yugoslav air defense system is now operating in Serbia and Montenegro and probably remains tied to remaining assets in Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia, however, resulted in the loss of facilities and up to 50 percent of the technically trained personnel required to operate medium-range (SA-2, SA-3) and tactical (SA-6, SA-9, and SA-13) missiles. These losses currently limit the air defense network's capabilities. Yugoslavia's inventory of older SAMs can be defeated by evasive tactics, countermeasures, and electronic warfare. Consequently, the principal ground-based air defense threat is likely to be shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SA-7, SA-14, and possibly SA-16) and air defense artillery.

The Yugoslav Military

In response to a large-scale Western peacekeeping presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade would increase its defensive readiness. Political and military authorities in Belgrade believe the United States and its NATO Allies, bent on dominating the post–Cold War world, intend to subdue, if not dismember, their Serb state. Federal authorities would step up recruitment and training, disperse their supplies and forces—including naval elements from the Kotor Bay, and occupy alternate command sites in response to what they perceived as a heightened Western threat to Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav officials probably would respond indirectly if Western forces intervened to end the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although Belgrade would want to avoid provoking Western retaliation, it probably would attempt covertly to supply the Bosnian

Irregular Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina

There are some 100,000 indigenous Serb, Croat, and Muslim irregulars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including armed political party militants, Yugoslav and Territorial Defense Force troops, and poorly armed locals. Irregulars receive outside support but are not under external operational control. They are motivated almost exclusively by ethnic nationalist and local territorial considerations:

- *Some 30,000 Serb irregulars receive material aid, especially fuel and ammunition, from the Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav armies. Their dependence on these supplies gives the Bosnian Serb Army and Yugoslavs limited influence over their activities.*
- *Approximately 40,000 Croat irregulars in Bosnia and Herzegovina receive equipment and funds from Croatia and from emigre sources in North America, Europe, and Australia, but most operate independently of Zagreb.*
- *Some 30,000 Muslim irregulars receive equipment and money primarily from Muslims in other countries.*

With inadequate weapons, maintenance, training, and fuel, the irregular forces are not strong enough to conduct major offensive military efforts and probably do not want to. Their objectives focus instead on holding their immediate surroundings and trying to create ethnically pure regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Serbs with weapons, ammunition, and "volunteers" to drive up the human cost of Western intervention.

Belgrade would forcefully resist any Western attack on Yugoslavia. In such circumstances, the federal government anticipates heavy losses among its forces. Yugoslav leaders believe, however, that their nation can successfully withstand an air campaign and that to subdue the Serbian nation, Western forces would be forced to invade their territory. If so, the bulk of Yugoslav resistance would be from ground forces. The federal leadership believes war is likely to come only with ample warning after a prolonged crisis, and Belgrade would use such a period to mobilize fully, disperse its forces, and hide key assets. The army would deploy thousands of light infantry for prolonged operations in the country's interior. The Yugoslav navy's vulnerability in Kotor Bay and inability to defend the Montenegrin coast suggest that the navy would attempt to attack Western naval forces in the Adriatic, although the possibility of a successful attack would be low.

The Croatian Armed Forces and HVO

Both Croatian army and HVO units are likely to view any foreign intervention as disabling their strongest enemy, and they would exploit the presence of Western forces to take contested areas and improve their defensive positions. In doing so, Croatian army and HVO forces would seek to avoid conflict with Western forces; small local clashes resulting from weak command and control could occur, however.

Figure 3
UN Forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina[a]

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The Bosnian Army

The Bosnian army would welcome Western forces. Sarajevo undoubtedly views Western military intervention as its best chance for survival. The Bosnians would try to occupy areas vacated by BSA units and probably would step up guerrilla attacks on Serb forces. Should Western forces oppose such actions, local Bosnian units probably would respond violently, while trying to make their acts appear to be the work of Serbs.

Effect on Regional Dynamics

Western military intervention could ignite conflicts elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia:

- Radical Kosovars might be tempted by Western intervention to launch an uprising in their province. The federal army has units stationed in Kosovo that could move quickly, in concert with internal security forces, to suppress civil disorder or insurrection. Ethnic Albanian opposition forces in Kosovo are few and not well armed.

- In Croatia, the Croatian army probably would take advantage of Western operations to launch limited local offensives along the borders of Serb-held regions, threatening UN Protection Forces already there. A Western offensive against the Serbs, either in Bosnia or Yugoslavia, would strongly tempt Zagreb to try to retake the entire Krajina and all of Slavonia from the Serbs.

The Threat to Neighboring States

The Yugoslav military is the most potent force in the region, but it cannot operate far beyond the borders of the Yugoslav state. Designed for static area defense, the federal command and control structure and logistic system can provide only limited support to mobile operations or to operations over extended distances. Yugoslav armored and mechanized brigades, nevertheless, can threaten the border areas of surrounding states, while Belgrade's air force could quickly win air superiority over virtually any of its immediate neighbors:

- Macedonia's military is little more than a police force. Almost completely disarmed when federal forces withdrew in 1992, the Macedonian armed forces would have trouble coping with internal ethnic unrest and could not oppose Yugoslav cross-border operations.

- Small, poorly equipped Albanian forces would be no match for the Yugoslav army. Poor roads and rough terrain, however, would limit Belgrade's ground operations to border areas.

- Bulgaria's armed forces, hampered by obsolete equipment, inadequate training, and logistic shortfalls, would require external assistance to repel a Yugoslav invasion.

- Romanian forces are capable of defending their nation against a Yugoslav attack. Romania's 172,000-man army is more than 70 percent larger than the Yugoslav ground force.

- Hungary's small armed forces lack adequate air defenses, and the army confronts significant logistic and equipment shortfalls. Budapest could defend against minor border incursions, but would require outside help to repel a large Yugoslav attack.

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Figure 4
Military Terrain of Former Yugoslavia



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Information available as of 3 June 1993 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.